This article considers when and how the ancient common law maxim
Introduction

Modern environmental law appears to be at a crossroads. There is a growing consensus that its "disregard for total load, or the cumulative environmental impact created by all human activity-past, present, and future" is one of its principal failures. 1 Canadian commentators have noted, for example, that the approximately 1,900 people who die from air pollution in Ontario every year "are not the victims of acute environmental crises" but rather of individual "toxic drops in the bucket". 2 Similarly, in the United States, recent scholarship has suggested that the "greatest remaining water quality challenges arise from the cumulative While there are signs of positive change on this front, with several Canadian provinces and territories adopting ambitious land-use planning frameworks and legislation specifically intended to manage cumulative effects, 8 there is at the same time a force pushing in the opposite direction. I refer to the widespread adoption of "risk-based" approaches-throughout the western world and in virtually all sectors-to regulatory activities. Risk-based regulation is described by two leading authorities as: [A] targeting of inspection and enforcement resources that is based on an assessment of the risks that a regulated person or firm poses to the regulator's objectives. The key components of the approach are evaluations of the risk of non-compliance and calculations regarding the impact that the non-compliance will have on the regulatory body's ability to achieve its objectives. Risk-based regulation involves identifying and classifying risks (e.g., high, medium and low) and allocating departmental resources accordingly. According to the influential 2005 Hampton Report from the United Kingdom: "Proper analysis of risk directs regulators' efforts at areas where it is most needed, and should enable them to reduce the administrative burden of regulation, while maintaining or even improving regulatory . Risk-based regulation appears to be the latest trend in a series of regulatory approaches emerging since the 1990s, including "responsive regulation" and so-called "smart regulation". Thus, where this article refers to "risk-based regulation", it is referring to a specific, policy-based approach to the activity of regulating rather than to any specific delegated legislation.
outcomes."
10 In Canada, risk-based approaches have since been adopted by the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), 11 Environment Canada 12 and the National Energy Board. 13 Provincially, the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) (formerly the Energy Resources Conservation Board) has a well-established risk-based regime, 14 13. The National Energy Board describes its evaluation of regulated companies for the purposes of determining appropriate compliance verification activities as a "risk-informed approach" that includes "identification of potential consequences to people and the environment posed by facilities . . . based on its location, type, age [and] operating history" and "a review of . . . the company's or operator's management of these consequences collected through previous compliance monitoring activities". National Energy Board, "NEB's Regulatory Framework" (8 January 2015), online: <www.neb-one.gc.ca/ sftnvrnmnt/prtctng/index-eng.html>. 14. In contrast to the preceding examples, the Alberta government has actually mandated the AER via directive to implement a risk-based approach to compliance and enforcement. See Alberta Energy Regulator, "Risk Assessed Noncompliance", online: <www.aer.ca/ of Natural Resources announced a move toward a risk-based approach in 2012.
15
On its face, such an evidence-based rationalization of resources appears eminently sensible, especially considering the resource constraints currently facing most government agencies and departments. 16 The reality, however, is that risk-based approaches are inherently complex and give rise to a number of challenges, the most relevant being a tendency "to neglect lower levels of risk, which, if numerous and broadly spread, may involve considerable cumulative dangers". As stated in Directive 019: Compliance Assurance, the AER has compiled a list of noncompliant events that is organized into compliance categories to assist AER stakeholders. The AER uses a risk assessment process to predetermine the level of inherent risk associated with a noncompliance with each AER requirement. Each noncompliant event has an associated low or high risk rating based on the results of the risk assessment process for each AER requirement.
Ibid.
15. See Ontario, Ministry of Natural Resources, Lake Nipissing Fisheries Management Plan: "Valuing a Diverse Fishery", Draft, March 2014 at 75-76, online: <www.ontario.ca/ document/lake-nipissing-fisheries-management-plan-draft>. The report asserts:
The Ministry has moved to a formalized risk-based approach to compliance. . . .
• The risk-based compliance framework will enable the Ministry to focus their enforcement resources on the area of greatest risk. These will include:
• Against this backdrop, this article considers the application of what may be one of the earliest examples of risk-based regulation-the ancient common law maxim de minimis non curat lex ("the law does not concern itself with trifling matters"). 18 More specifically, this article considers when and how the maxim ought to be applied in Canadian environmental law, bearing in mind that in this context its application renders a regulatory regime blind to certain conduct, which in turn creates the potential for environmental degradation through cumulative effects.
The article proceeds in two Parts. Part I sets out the basic and unique principles governing the maxim's application in this context, recognizing that it plays several different roles in Canadian law generally. 19 It observes that there is presently considerable confusion as to the maxim's mere availability, confusion that appears to be rooted in a failure to recognize that the maxim plays at least two potential roles-even within this one context. The law should be considered settled that the maxim applies as an interpretive aid in certain contexts, though it is less settled in its availability as a defence.
Part II argues for judicial reconsideration of what constitutes de minimis in the environmental law context. Much of the case law presumes a single-step test, namely the magnitude of the deviation from a prescribed standard, most often expressed in terms of the amount of pollution or the level of environmental harm. The foundational jurisprudence, however, points to a two-part test that assesses both the magnitude of the harm as well as the potential consequences if the regulated conduct were to be allowed generally. The de minimis test thus contains within it a simplified cumulative effects analysis, a task that has been too readily dismissed 18. Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed, sub verbo "de minimis non curat lex". Although the focus of this article is Canadian environmental law, much of the discussion and analysis appears equally applicable to American environmental legislation. 19. In addition to the regulatory and criminal law context, the maxim or some related notion of triviality plays a role in the torts of negligence, nuisance and constiutional law. In negligence, causation must be more as too complex for the common law to address. 20 A two-step approach is not only more consistent with the foundational jurisprudence, it is also supported when the maxim is considered through the lens of risk-based regulation, where the goal is to identify harms that can truly be disregarded in light of the relevant legislative objectives. Approached this way, the maxim's application also fits more comfortably within the context of statutory interpretation, bearing in mind especially the objectives of environmental legislation. The article concludes with some final observations on the importance of a robust understanding of the maxim in the environmental law context. The Canadian judicial system is one that predominantly focuses on specific incidents and disputes between specific parties, both from a regulatory and common law perspective . . .. [T]he rules and proceedings are not well-suited to dealing with preventing and repairing harm to the environment itself and addressing the broad scope and extent of cumulative effects management. 26 after one of its sedimentation ponds overflowed, allowing approximately 3,000 gallons of mine and storm water to escape into Moose Lake, a fish-bearing lake in northwestern Ontario. 27 Water samples taken from the sedimentation pond on the day of the spill indicated that although the water's pH was above the permissible limit, 28 levels of cyanide, copper, arsenic and total suspended solids were below authorized limits. 29 At trial, Clarke J invoked de minimis to dismiss the charges related to the unlawful deposit of deleterious substances into waters frequented by fish, stating: "I am of the view that . . . any effect the concentration of any of the deposits which occurred would have had no or at the very worst only a very trifling effect on fish and so the ancient principle of de minimis non curat lex applies".
I. De Minimis in Canadian Environmental Law
A. Confusion as to Whether the Maxim Applies
30
On appeal to the Superior Court, the Crown argued that the MMER explicitly deemed cyanide, copper, arsenic and total suspended solids to be deleterious at any concentration, 31 such that the application of the maxim was inappropriate. In making this argument, the Crown relied on the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal's decision in R v Croft where the accused 22 was charged with unlawful possession of undersized lobsters, contrary to subsection 57(2) of the Atlantic Fishery Regulation, 1985 . 32 The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held that the maxim had no application in the circumstances of that case: This is, as we have said, a strict liability offence. Moreover, it is one where compliance is measured in millimetres. Parliament has decided where it chooses to draw the line. In this sense it is much the same as imposing a limit of 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood in the Criminal Code provisions prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft or railway equipment while impaired. There is no tolerance or margin extended for "almost" or "close" compliance. The public interest in protecting our commercial fishery is hardly a trifling matter. The maxim has no application here.
33
The Crown also relied on R v Goodman, another prosecution under the Fisheries Act, where, in dismissing the defendant's de minimis argument, the Court held that it is not its role "to determine whether [the] prosecution was in the public interest. It is not for this court to find that dredging, both large-scale and small, occurs regularly, and therefore, prosecution of these accused for these offences is unfair." 34 Accepting these authorities, the Court in Williams Operating declared broadly that "de minimis does not apply to public welfare offences or strict liability offences", 35 Though one could embark on a lengthy dissertation regarding this argument, including a review of relevant case law, it is sufficient to say that this Court accepts the argument and conclusion reached in [Williams Operating] at paragraph 86 that . . . de minimus does not apply to public welfare offences or strict liability offences. As such, where matters involve the public interest the de minimus defence will fail and does so in this case.
Ibid. See also Syncrude, supra note 21. However, this holding was explicitly rejected and the maxim was applied in R v UBA Inc. 37 In this case, the accused was charged with discharging, or permitting the discharge of, a contaminant-caustic soda-into the natural environment that caused, or was likely to cause, an adverse effect, contrary to subsection 14 (1) Turning to the facts before him, Woodworth JP acknowledged that while caustic soda is corrosive and can pose health risks in situations of acute exposure or respiratory risks where mists are generated . . . the only evidence of any adverse effect is so trivial or minimal that it should not attract penal consequences . . .. Therefore the Crown has not established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused or permitted the discharge of a contaminant into the natural environment that caused or was likely to cause an adverse effect in the circumstances. 
Finally, in another recent Ontario case, Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources) v 819743 Ontario Inc,
42 the Court cited with approval recent commentary that "arguments about de minimis effects ought to be viewed with scepticism", and that the Crown-here at the sentencing stage-"may rely on the analogy of 'death by a thousand cuts', to illustrate the cumulative nature of environmental damage". 43 This brief survey demonstrates that there is currently considerable disagreement in the jurisprudence about what role-if any-de minimis should play in environmental law. In rejecting its application, some courts, like the court in Croft, have seized on the "strict liability" nature of environmental offences, presumably alluding to the restricted defences available in this context. 44 Others, exemplified by Goodman, have expressed concern that the maxim's use stretches the proper role of the judiciary within the separation of powers. 45 Courts have also expressed concern about cumulative effects. 46 In its most recent environmental law decision, Castonguay Blasting Ltd v Ontario (Environment), the Supreme Court simply reaffirmed "non-triviality" as an essential element of both the principal prohibition (section 14) and the duty to report occurrences out of the normal course of events (section 15) under Ontario's EPA. In my view, the destruction of any ecosystem or environment is a gradual process, effected by cumulative acts-a death by a thousand cuts, as it were. Each offender is as responsible for the total harm as the last one, who visibly triggers the end. The first offender can't be allowed to escape with only nominal consequences because his input is not as readily apparent. 
B. Two Distinct and Mutually Exclusive Roles for De Minimis
At least some of the confusion in the case law could be resolved by recognizing the two separate and distinct roles that de minimis has come to play. 48 The first and relatively well-settled role is as an aid in statutory interpretation, which as noted above, is rooted in the Supreme Court's decision in Canadian Pacific. The second and less settled role is as a defence. 49 These two roles are mutually exclusive. The maxim's application in the statutory interpretation context identifies conduct that is not captured by the relevant statutory provision (i.e., does not meet the actus reus). Where the maxim places the impugned conduct outside the scope of the actus reus, its availability as a defence is rendered redundant. Where, however, the maxim is not applicable as an interpretative aid, its availability-if any-is restricted to the defence stage.
The applicability of the maxim as a matter of statutory interpretation in some instances and not others and the current uncertainty as to its availability as a defence would appear sufficient to justify distinguishing between these two roles, but there are additional reasons. As part of the statutory interpretation exercise, de minimis plays an important role not just in the courts but also in the offices of regulator and industry counsel, as these advise their clients on their respective regulatory burdens (e.g., whether a permit should be required or sought for a certain work or undertaking, respectively). Inside the courtroom, the maxim's role in delineating the actus reus of any given offence means that the burden will be on the Crown to prove this element-or rather its absence-beyond a reasonable doubt. In its role as a defence, and assuming it is available 48. See Paule Halley, "La règle de minimis non curat lex en droit de l'environnement", Développements récents en droit de l'environnement, vol 214 (Cowansville, Que: Yvon Blais, 2004) at 4. Halley notes that the maxim has been used in some form in the context of statutory interpretation, as a defence, in sentencing and, finally, in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. This article considers the first and second applications. At the third (sentencing) stage, an accused will have gone through the time, cost and effort of a trial, all of which has resulted in a conviction, such that it seems contradictory to speak of the maxim; at this stage the law clearly has concerned itself with "the matter". As for prosecutorial discretion, whatever role de minimis plays here would seem dictated by its consideration in the first two contexts. in the strict liability context, the accused would have the burden of persuading the court on a balance of probabilities that the conduct should be considered too trivial to warrant penal consequences-the same burden imposed with respect to the reasonable care defences. 50 Finally, as a principle of statutory interpretation, the maxim sits relatively comfortably within the judiciary's conventional role under the separation of powers. 51 As a defence, it invites the courts to second-guess the executive branch on matters of public interest by deliberately overlooking expressly prohibited conduct.
(i) De Minimis in Statutory Interpretation
As an aid in statutory interpretation, the maxim is most clearly applicable where a legislature (with respect to a statute) or its chosen delegate (with respect to subordinate regulations) has drafted the relevant provisions in general terms. Here, de minimis acts alongside other principles of interpretation as a part of the purposive approach to resolving legislative ambiguities. 52 It was in the context of precisely such legislation that the Supreme Court endorsed reliance on de minimis in Canadian Pacific. As noted above, the relevant provision in that case prohibited the discharge of contaminants that cause, or are likely to cause, an "adverse effect", which the legislation defined as including "impairment of the quality of the natural environment for any use that can be made of it". 53 Counsel for 50. The Canadian Bar Association once recommended that the former approach be adopted for criminal offences generally: "Where the Crown has proved all of the essential elements of an offence the Court may, before a finding of guilt is entered, stay the proceedings against the accused with respect to that offence, where the accused satisfies the Court on the balance of probabilities that . . . the violation was too trivial to warrant a finding of guilt." Canadian Bar Association, "Principles of Canadian Pacific argued that the expression "for any use that can be made of it" was so "vague and broad that it fails to provide an intelligible standard that would enable citizens to regulate their conduct", 54 thus contravening section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 55 Writing for the Court, Gonthier J held that, properly interpreted, the prohibition was not unconstitutionally vague:
[I]nterpreting the concept of "use" in s. 13(1)(a) in a restrictive manner is supported not only by its place in the legislative scheme, but also by the principle that a statute should be interpreted to avoid absurd results. . . . In particular, because the legislature is presumed not to have intended to attach penal consequences to trivial or minimal violations of a provision, the absurdity principle allows for the narrowing of the scope of the provision. In this respect, the absurdity principle is closely related to the maxim, de minimis non curat lex (the law does not concern itself with trifles). The rationale of this doctrine was explained by Sir William Scott in the case of The "Reward" (1818):
The Court is not bound to a strictness at once harsh and pedantic in the application of statutes. The law permits the qualification implied in the ancient maxim De minimis non curat lex.-Where there are irregularities of very slight consequence, it does not intend that the infliction of penalties should be inflexibly severe. If the deviation were a mere trifle, which, if continued in practice, would weigh little or nothing on the public interest, it might properly be overlooked.
The absurdity, strict interpretation and de minimis principles assist in narrowing the scope of the expression "for any use that can be made of [the natural environment]", and determining the area of risk created by s. 13(1)(a) EPA. 56 Subsequently, several commentators suggested that the maxim's role as an interpretive aid be limited to those instances where the general wording of the prohibition in the legislation "invites an interpretation restricting its scope". 57 In fact, this position was articulated well before Canadian Pacific. As early as 1978, one commentator observed that the maxim "comes into its own when the legislature has not attempted mathematical precision but has used ordinary language, the application of which 54 In the context of environmental protection legislation, a strict requirement of drafting precision might well undermine the ability of the legislature to provide for a comprehensive and flexible regime. As the Law Reform Commission suggests, then, generally framed pollution prohibitions are desirable from a public policy perspective. . . . In my view, the generality of s. 13(1)(a) ensures flexibility in the law, so that the EPA may respond to a wide range of environmentally harmful scenarios which could not have been foreseen at the time of its enactment. . . . In the area of environmental protection, legislators have two choices. They may enact detailed provisions which prohibit the release of particular quantities of enumerated substances into the natural environment. Alternatively, they may choose a more general prohibition of "pollution", and rely on the courts to determine whether, in a particular case, the release of a substance into the natural environment is of sufficient magnitude to attract legislative sanction.
59
This reasoning actually fits well with-and provides a defensible explanation for-most of those cases discussed above where the maxim's application was rejected. In Croft, for example, the accused were charged with possessing undersized lobsters (less than 82 millimetres from carapace to carapace) contrary to subsection 57(2) of the Atlantic Fishery Regulation, 1985, a prohibition whose parameters are plain on its face. 59. Canadian Pacific, supra note 39 at paras 52-53. See also Castonguay Blasting, supra note 47 at para 9. As further discussed in Part II of this article, this intended flexibility would seem to capture within its scope concerns with respect to cumulative effects. 60. Supra note 32, s 57(2). specified conditions. 61 Neither of these schemes require application of the de minimis maxim to assist in carving out the "area of risk".
62
By comparison, the EPA provisions in question in UBA-the same provisions considered in Canadian Pacific-do not employ "mathematical precision", making the maxim's application hard to avoid. The same was true for a previous version of subsection 35 (1) of the Fisheries Act, which prohibited the "harmful alteration, disruption or destruction [HADD] of fish habitat". 63 Contrary to the holding in Goodman, courts had consistently employed the de minimis maxim to interpret section 35's prior iteration. 64 For example, in R v Levesque, which also involved a section 7 vagueness challenge, the Court held that:
[T]he scope of the legal debate around the carrying out of any work or undertaking that results in [HADD] is narrowed, to the extent that trivial, non-permanent, passing or minimal alterations or disruptions of fish habitat do not bring with them penal consequences. . . . [A]bsurdity, and de minimis principle . . . restrict a disruption of fish habitat to something that is more than a minimal, or trivial disruption.
65
Setting aside for the moment the manner in which the maxim was applied in Levesque, it is plain that not every centimetre of altered or disrupted habitat warranted penal consequences. Reliance on the de minimis principle in this context was therefore appropriate, as it will be in the future when courts interpret the prohibition against "the death of fish or the permanent alteration of, or destruction to, fish habitat" in the current section 35, under the revised version of the Fisheries Act.
(ii) De Minimis as a Defence
Where the legislature has chosen to "enact detailed provisions", the area of risk is clear. Nevertheless, the maxim may still be available in the form of a defence, as it appears to be for certain criminal offences.
68
At least three objections have been raised against the maxim's availability as a defence, the second and third of which are arguably equally applicable to its role in statutory interpretation. The first objection is of a "separation of powers" variety, and questions whether the judiciary ought to "second-guess" the other (democratically elected) branches of government in matters of public interest, whether in choosing the relevant regulatory parameters (for example, requiring effluent to have a pH between 6.0 and 9.5 pursuant to section 4 of the MMER) 69 or in deciding whether the offending conduct warrants prosecution. 70 Reasoning along the lines of the first category is discernable in Croft ("Parliament [sic] has decided where it chooses to draw the line" 71 ) while the second is evident in Goodman ("it is not for the Court to determine whether [the] prosecution was in the public interest" 72 ). This objection does not apply to the maxim's application in statutory interpretation because, as already explained, there should be no specific regulatory standards and therefore no second-guessing by the judiciary, the matter being one of the correct interpretation of the provisions in play.
The second argument against the maxim's use as a defence is that it is too uncertain. 70. See Halley, supra note 48 at 4 (prosecutors consider the triviality of the offence as part of a broader consideration as to whether a prosecution is in the "public interest"). See also Public Prosecution Service of Canada, Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook, online: <www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/index.html>. 71. Supra note 32 at para 15 (readers should note that in fact, it is Parliament's delegate, the Governor in Council, that "decided where it chooses to draw the line" with respect to undersized lobsters). 72. Supra note 34 at para 32.
Canada on the use of the maxim as a defence generally, McLachlin CJC described de minimis as "vague and difficult in application". 73 It has been suggested that "[w]hat is or is not trifling, in a specific situation, will be difficult to agree upon." 74 The third and final objection is that the maxim overlooks cumulative effects. This concern was expressed in R v Kelsey, where the accused was convicted of contravening the previous section 31 of the Fisheries Act (the prohibition against HADD) for having installed metal culverts in fish-bearing waters without authorization. 75 On appeal, counsel argued that de minimis should be applied. The Court disagreed:
In the words of the expert witness Mr. McCuvvin, when commenting on the installation of the culverts, "I am saying that actions like that, that go unchecked, will basically spell the death knell of the productivity of the system". . . . The destruction of any environment or ecosystem is indeed a gradual process effected by cumulative acts.
A similar observation was made in R v Canadian Forest Products Ltd
77
which dealt with the Fisheries Act section 36 prohibition against the deposit of deleterious substances. 78 The Court held that "[a]ll pollution legislation is concerned not only with the immediate damage of a pollutant but also by the cumulative effect of any substance." Subject to subsection (4), no person shall deposit or permit the deposit of a deleterious substance of any type in water frequented by fish or in any place under any conditions where the deleterious substance or any other deleterious substance that results from the deposit of the deleterious substance may enter any such water.
Ibid.
Canadian Forest Products, supra note 77 at 119 [emphasis added].
Returning to the first objection, and with respect to the setting of regulatory standards in particular, this is probably the strongest argument against the maxim's availability as a defence and one to which there appears no obvious counter-argument. With respect to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, perhaps the best response is the one given by Arbour J, dissenting, in Canadian Foundation for Children: "The good judgment of prosecutors in eliminating trivial cases is necessary but not sufficient to the workings of the criminal law." 80 It is therefore appropriate-indeed necessary-for the courts to have a means of exculpating the accused.
With respect to the second and third objections, which, as noted above, appear equally applicable to the maxim's application in statutory interpretation as to its role as a defence, one potential answer-and the focus of Part II-is to reconsider how the maxim is applied. Properly construed, de minimis is no less certain than many other judicial frameworks, nor should it give rise to harm through cumulative effects.
II. The De Minimis Maxim Properly Construed
A. De Minimis as a Two-Part Test
When applying the de minimis principle, courts tend to consider only a single variable, namely the degree to which the impugned conduct deviates from the prescribed standard, often expressed in terms of the amount of environmental harm incurred. In Williams Operating, the trial judge applied the maxim because in his view the deposits at issue would have "no or at the very worst only a very trifling effect on fish". 81 In UBA, the Court applied the maxim because "the only evidence of any adverse effect is so trivial or minimal that it should not attract penal consequences". 82 Similarly, in Castonguay Blasting, the Supreme Court focused on the magnitude of harm from the specific incident in question to determine that it was not trivial: "The force of the blast, and the rocks it produced, were so powerful they caused extensive and significant property damage." If one considers the de minimis maxim's foundational case, The Reward, 84 however, the test actually involves two related inquiries: "If the deviation were a mere trifle, which, if continued in practice, would weigh little or nothing on the public interest, it might properly be overlooked." 85 Broken down into parts, the first part of the maxim asks whether the offence ("the deviation") seems minimal ("a mere trifle"). If not, the inquiry is at an end. If it does, however, then the analysis turns to the potential for the combined or cumulative effects of such deviations ("if continued in practice") to interfere or undermine ("weigh . . . on") the legislature's objectives in promulgating the relevant regulatory regime ("the public interest"). The goal is to identify conduct that the regulatory regime may ignore ("might properly be overlooked") while still attaining its objective(s).
Although the reference to continuity arguably pertains to the specific offence before the court (and the potential effect if it were to continue in practice), any ambiguity on this front is resolved by the maxim's actual application in The Reward. In finding the accused guilty of exporting Jamaican logwood, the Court stated:
In the present case, the exact quantity is not easily ascertained. Jamaican logwood illegally exported by the accused). It also considered the potential for such conduct, if allowed to be widespread, to undermine the public interest as expressed in the relevant prohibition.
There are several Canadian cases that apply a similar approach. In Syncrude, for example, the Court held that even if de minimis did apply to the prohibition at issue (a matter which it left undecided), it was inapplicable in that case because:
Syncrude's conduct in connection with the offences is not minimal or trivial. Unfortunately some waterfowl will die in the tar sands tailings ponds regardless of deterrent efforts. More birds will die without effective deterrents. I have no doubt that, in this context, the failure to take all reasonable steps to deter waterfowl from the Aurora Settling Basin was not at all trivial.
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Justice Tjosvold's references to "tar sands tailings ponds" and "deterrent efforts" in the plural, along with his reference to "context" suggest that he had turned his mind to the potential cumulative effect of insufficient efforts to deter migratory birds in the oil sands region generally. This is not surprising given Tjosvold J's earlier characterization of the prohibition: "As with most regulatory offences, the legislation is not just directed at the immediate and direct effect of the proscribed conduct but also at the potential harm if that conduct was widespread." In my opinion the defence of de minimis . . . is not available to assist the Appellant. Granted, the trial Judge found that the work was insignificant when compared to the vast area of the lake and shoreline itself. That, I think, is not the test . . . this was a major channel dredging, a substantial piece of work. In my view, a de minimis defence would only be available if the work was in the nature of a shovelful or two of digging, or something in the nature of clam or mussel digging on the foreshore on a casual basis. It would not cover an operation such as that described here. It should not be calculated by a comparison of an area of work compared to area of total lake or body of water. expressly mention cumulative effects, such a concern can be seen in Wilson J's contrasting of a dredging operation with clam or mussel digging on "a casual basis". Casual digging conveys the idea of randomness or infrequency, in contrast to the relatively routine requirements of dredging. Similarly, Wilson J's refusal to view the harm in the context of the entire lake is consistent with a recognition that few harms would be captured under such an approach.
Beyond these few examples, however, the case law is inconstant as to how to characterize the "deviation" that is the focus of the maxim. In Canadian Pacific, the focus is on the amount of pollution released or the amount of environmental harm caused. This approach is also adopted by the trial judges in Williams Operating and UBA. In contrast, the courts in Jackson, Syncrude and Kelsey considered not only the amount of harm caused, but also the nature of the conduct giving rise to the offence (dredging, tailings ponds and culverts, respectively), an approach that finds support in the commentary.
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In my view, both the amount of environmental harm and the nature of the conduct are relevant, but at different stages of the analysis. Evidence as to the amount of environmental harm caused can be used to establish prima facie triviality (the first part of the de minimis test), but this information alone is insufficient to reach a conclusion on its potential to "weigh on the public interest" (the second part of the de minimis test). Of course, if widespread, the destruction of ten square metres of fish habitat, or the release of 3,000 gallons of mine water, or the death of 1,500 birds would weigh on the public interest, but simply assuming such widespread harm would render the maxim's availability illusory. What is needed, instead, is some basis for assessing whether such a risk is real. It is here (2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of a conviction.
that the conduct giving rise to the offence is relevant, as it sheds light on the actual potential for cumulative harm. Most obviously, if the conduct is common, then there is clear potential for cumulative effects and any prima facie finding of triviality will be defeated unless the harm is so miniscule that even cumulatively it can "properly be overlooked". 91 At the other end of the spectrum sits conduct that is rare and often unintentional (i.e., accidental). 92 Intention, after all, is not a requisite element for regulatory (strict liability) offences. 93 Here the maxim has the potential to bleed into the defence of due diligence, in that a finding of due diligence suggests that the harm was the result of a fluke or bad luck, and thus any potential for cumulative effects is low. There will, however, be instances of unintentional conduct where the potential for cumulative harm remains significant. 94 Ultimately, neither the amount of harm, nor the conduct giving rise to it, are on their own sufficiently reliable metrics for potential cumulative effects. The proper approach takes both into account.
At this stage of the discussion, it is useful to return to the concepts and principles of modern cumulative effects analysis and risk-based regulation. I am not arguing that cumulative effects analysis, as predominantly practiced in the environmental assessment context, ought now to be incorporated into the de minimis test. As explained above, the maxim's concern for cumulative effects has deep roots. Similarly, the maxim has always been risk oriented. The goal here is simply to provide additional insight into its application before considering whether the approach proposed herein is consistent with the maxim's role in interpreting environmental legislation.
B. De Minimis as Simplified Cumulative Effects Analysis
As stated at the outset of this article, the problem of cumulative environmental effects is both widespread and widely understood. While the problem is increasingly being addressed on a regional basis through land-use planning frameworks, most of the advances in cumulative effects analysis have been in the environmental assessment context. 95 In Canada, environmental assessment is predominantly used for proposed physical works, such as mines, dams and pipelines, and it has been described as "a planning tool [with] both an information-gathering and a decision-making component which provide the decision maker with an objective basis for granting or denying approval for a proposed development". 96 Recognizing that projects cannot be assessed in isolation, specific procedures for identifying and analyzing cumulative environmental effects have been developed. These procedures are variously referred to as "cumulative effects analysis" or "cumulative effects assessment":
Cumulative Effects Assessment (CEA) is done to ensure the incremental effects resulting from the combined influences of various actions are assessed. These incremental effects may be significant even though the effects of each action, when independently assessed, are considered insignificant.
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The Canadian CEA literature identifies four ways in which cumulative effects of individually minor acts may result in environmental degradation, three of which are useful to consider here:
• Physical-chemical transport: a physical or chemical constituent is transported away from the action under review where it then interacts with another action (e.g., air emissions, waste water effluent, sediment).
• Nibbling loss: the gradual disturbance and loss of land and habitat (e.g., clearing of land for a new sub-division and roads into a forested area).
• Spatial and temporal crowding: Cumulative effects can occur when too much is happening within too small an area and in too brief a period of time. A threshold may be exceeded and the environment may not be able to recover to pre-disturbance conditions . . .. Spatial crowding results in an overlap of effects among actions. Each of these mechanisms is illustrated by the cases considered thus far. The accidental deposit of 3,000 gallons of mine and storm water in Williams Operating could fall into both the first and third categories depending on the circumstances. As described by the expert witness in Kelsey, the unauthorized construction of culverts could fall into the second and third categories. The potential cumulative danger posed by the death of 1,600 birds in Syncrude also fits into the third category, bearing in mind the proximity of numerous other tailings ponds in the area. 99 In light of the many ways in which cumulative environmental harm manifests, it is not surprising that CEA can be complex. In an effort to avoid "assessing everything", project proponents and environmental assessment consultants must determine the scope of the assessment at the outset. 100 The starting point is to identify the subject of the analysis.
101
In the environmental assessment context, this is often referred to as the valued ecosystem component (VEC): "Any part of the environment that is considered important by the proponent, public, scientists and government involved in the assessment process." 102 The next task is to determine the spatial and temporal boundaries for the assessment. The purpose of this exercise is to determine which other activities or conduct-current and future-should be considered in the assessment. Generally speaking, CEA involves a consideration of "certain" future activities (those that will definitely happen) and those that are "reasonably foreseeable". 
MBCA,
104 the public interest or VEC at stake is migratory birds, recognized in the Act "for their nutritional, social, cultural, spiritual, ecological, economic, and aesthetic values". 105 In Croft, Williams Operating and all situations involving the Fisheries Act, the public interest or VEC is the fisheries resource, which the Supreme Court has described as a "common property resource" to be managed in the public interest on behalf of all Canadians.
106
With respect to the demarcation of spatial and temporal boundaries, and the selection of relevant activities in particular, the de minimis test is fortunately considerably simpler than actual CEA. This is because there is only one activity relevant to the de minimis inquiry: either the past conduct that brought an accused before the court or the future conduct that is being contemplated by the regulated community. Nevertheless, the emphasis in CEA on "certain" and "reasonably foreseeable" activities is useful because it underscores the importance of assessing the actual potential for cumulative effects. This lends additional support to an approach to de minimis that looks beyond the harm caused in the abstract to consider the originating conduct. This aspect of CEA is also useful in that it suggests regard should be given not just to conduct that is certain to be widespread, but also to conduct whose widespread adoption is reasonably foreseeable. 107 104. Supra note 22 (the Act states that "[n]o person or vessel shall deposit a substance that is harmful to migratory birds, or permit such a substance to be deposited, in waters or an area frequented by migratory birds or in a place from which the substance may enter such waters or such an area", s 5.1 (1) (12) of the Constitution Act, 1867 refers to the fisheries as a resource; "a source of national or provincial wealth"; a "common property resource" to be managed for the good of all Canadians. The fisheries resource includes the animals that inhabit the seas. But it also embraces commercial and economic interests, aboriginal rights and interests, and the public interest in sport and recreation.
Ibid [citations omitted]. 107. Bearing in mind that the information required to have certain knowledge will not generally be available to the public or even private industry.
C. De Minimis in Risk-Based Regulation
Additional insight into the maxim can also be gained by situating de minimis within a modern risk-based regulatory regime. The Alberta Energy Regulator's "Compliance Assurance Risk Assessment Matrix" groups all enforcement activities into either a high-risk or low-risk category. 108 The high-risk category is described as representing "an unacceptable level of risk requiring the inclusion of mitigation measures", while the low-risk category represents "an acceptable level of risk that requires mitigative measures within an acceptable time frame". 109 In other words, high-risk conduct requires an immediate response, while low-risk conduct can wait. In this kind of framework, there is no space reserved for de minimis level risks. Rather, the de minimis maxim serves to identify conduct irrelevant to the regime's regulatory purpose. Therefore, when applying the maxim, it is useful to ask the following relatively simple question: Is the conduct in question irrelevant to the legislature's purpose in promulgating the relevant regime? If not, then it is likely not de minimis.
110
This is not to suggest that all pollution or environmental damage ought to be prohibited outright. The reality is that many so-called prohibitions are simply gateways to negotiation and further regulation.
111 Section 35 of the Fisheries Act-still widely regarded as Canada's most important federal environmental law-is a classic example. In its most recent iteration, subsection 35(1) prohibits works, undertakings and activities that result in the death of fish, or that permanently alter or destroy their habitat, that are part of or support commercial, recreational or Aboriginal fisheries. 111. See Pardy, supra note 1 (observing that some environmental statutes, such as Ontario's EPA "include provisions that appear to be substantive rules of wide application" but which upon closer analysis allow "government administrators to make inexact policy decisions that no one can predict ahead of time" at 34). 112. Fisheries Act, supra note 11 ("[n]o person shall carry on any work, undertaking or activity that results in serious harm", s 35(1)). The Act defines "serious harm" as "the death of fish and the permanent alteration to, or destruction of, fish habitat". Ibid, s 2(2).
Pursuant to subsection 35(2), however, a person may carry on a work, undertaking or activity without contravening subsection 35(1) if they are authorized by the Minister or pursuant to regulations.
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This reality was reflected in DFO's "risk assessment matrix" under the previous HADD regime, where risks to fish habitat were ranked high-, medium-, low-and no-risk as a function of the scale of negative effects and the sensitivity of the affected habitat.
114 High-risk activities were subject to a site-specific review and authorization, medium-risk activities to a streamlined authorization processes and low-risk activities to site-specific advice and guidelines. 115 As with the AER example above, no-risk (i.e., de minimis) harms received no attention whatsoever.
By incorporating a risk-based framework within their regulatory programs, the AER and DFO examples illustrate the important implications of deeming something to be de minimis: The regulatory regime essentially becomes blind to it. These frameworks also illustrate that low-risk conduct is different from de minimis conduct, an important distinction that Canadian regulators occasionally overlook.
Ibid, s 35(2). According to the Act:
A person may carry on a work, undertaking or activity without contravening subsection (1) if (a) the work, undertaking or activity is a prescribed work, undertaking or activity, or is carried on in or around prescribed Canadian fisheries waters, and the work, undertaking or activity is carried on in accordance with the prescribed conditions; (b) the carrying on of the work, undertaking or activity is authorized by the Minister and the work, undertaking or activity is carried on in accordance with the conditions established by the Minister; (c) the carrying on of the work, undertaking or activity is authorized by a prescribed person or entity and the work, undertaking or activity is carried on in accordance with the prescribed conditions; (d) the serious harm is produced as a result of doing anything that is authorized, otherwise permitted or required under this Act; or (e) the work, undertaking or activity is carried on in accordance with the regulations.
Ibid.
114. "DFO Practitioners Guide", supra note 11 at 17-18. 115. Ibid.
D. A Two-Part De Minimis as a Presumption of Statutory Interpretation
In Canadian Pacific, Gonthier J described de minimis as a presumption in statutory interpretation: "[T]he legislature is presumed not to have intended to attach penal consequences to trivial or minimal violations".
116
Bearing in mind the important distinction made above between prohibition and regulation (i.e., that the balancing act is generally not against penal consequences but rather some degree of regulation, as illustrated in DFO's risk framework), an approach to de minimis that takes cumulative effects into account is more consistent with most environmental legislation than an approach that fails to do so.
In Castonguay Blasting, the Supreme Court described the EPA as Ontario's principal environmental protection statute, entitled to a generous interpretation:
Moreover, as this Court recognized in Canadian Pacific, environmental protection is a complex subject matter-the environment itself and the wide range of activities which might harm it are not easily conducive to precise codification. As a result, environmental legislation embraces an expansive approach to ensure that it can adequately respond "to a wide variety of environmentally harmful scenarios, including ones which might not have been foreseen by the drafters of the legislation". Because the legislature is pursuing the objective of environmental protection, its intended reach is wide and deep.
117
The potential for cumulative harm fits comfortably within the rubric of harms "not easily conducive to precise codification", as does its inclusion as part of the de minimis test with legislation whose "intended reach is wide 116. Supra note 39 at para 61. For a more recent case in the criminal law context, see R v Gale, supra note 74. The Court there stated:
As can be seen, this case does not stand for the broad proposition for which it has so long been cited: that any matter a Court finds trifling can be dismissed. Rather The Reward involved a question of statutory interpretation and a desire to avoid the application of statutes in a pedantic manner so as to avoid the "infliction" of "inflexibly severe" penalties. . . . This principle allows a court to narrowly interpret a statute so as to avoid its application to trifling matters.
Ibid at para 28 [emphasis added]. The Court goes on to cite the Supreme Court's decision in Canadian Pacific, which suggests that the approach suggested herein may be equally applicable to the broader criminal law context. Supra note 39. 117. Castonguay Blasting, supra note 47 at para 9 [emphasis added, citations omitted]. and deep". Quite simply, it is seldom possible to define broadly applicable, ecologically relevant thresholds: "In a perfect world regulatory thresholds would correspond to clear ecological thresholds, but in practice, this is difficult to achieve because ecosystems are highly variable."
118 It is of some significance, then, that where the legislature (or its delegate) has enacted laws or regulations with "mathematical precision", such as the MMER, these are often accompanied with requirements to monitor and report ambient environmental effects as a way of verifying that the applicable limits are in fact protective.
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A cumulative effects approach to the maxim is also consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning regarding the duty to report under the Ontario EPA, which it bears stressing is only triggered by non-trivial (i.e., above de minimis) harm:
The purpose of the reporting requirement in s. 15 (1) Act. Indeed, and perhaps surprisingly to those following its recent amendment, 122 the latter's support for a cumulative effects approach to de minimis would appear stronger in its amended form, and in particular as a result of the addition of the section 6 factors and the section 6.1 purpose clause, both of which are intended to guide regulatory decision making under the Act. 123 The first two factors are (a) the contribution of the affected fish to commercial, recreational or Aboriginal fisheries and (b) any relevant fisheries management objectives. These factors suggest that whether given conduct could be considered trivial, even at the prima facie level, will be largely dependent on context and may require considerable fisheries-related knowledge and expertise. Further, in making her decisions, the Minister must "provide for the sustainability and ongoing productivity of commercial, recreational and Aboriginal fisheries". 124 It is difficult to see how the Minister could achieve this objective if she is blinded to cumulative effects by the workings of a maxim that fails to take these into account. Unsurprisingly, DFO's most recent policy suggests the opposite: "The consideration of cumulative effects on the state, resiliency, and natural biodiversity of the ecosystem will guide the Department in achieving the objectives."
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E. De Minimis Summarized
Properly construed in its historical jurisprudential context, the de minimis test directly accounts for-rather than ignores-the potential for cumulative effects. Applied as an aid in the course of statutory interpretation, the result is a practicable and predictable framework for identifying conduct that should, or should not be, subject to a given regulatory regime.
When applying the de minimis maxim, courts, regulators and those subject to regulation should adopt the following steps. First, does the environmental harm seem trivial or minor on its face? If not, the de minimis maxim does not apply. If the harm seems trivial, is the conduct giving rise to such harm of a kind that, if allowed, it could undermine a regulator's objectives through cumulative environmental effects? If the conduct is known to be widespread, or it is reasonably foreseeable that it might be, then the potential for cumulative harm exists and the maxim does not apply. Alternatively, if the conduct is infrequent or if the harm would be negligible even if it were widespread, then the maxim applies and the conduct may be properly overlooked.
Conclusion
In a 2006 position paper on the Fisheries Act, the British Columbia Business Council advocated for "incorporating a de minimis component . . . to make clear that small-scale activities which do not significantly affect fish habitat will not be captured by the prohibitions in ss. 35(1) of the Act". While the amended Fisheries Act suffered a different-if still not entirely comprehensible-fate, 127 the Business Council's proposal warrants further consideration. Not only is the Business Council's interpretation the polar opposite of the one advanced here, it goes beyond even the current case law, substituting minor harms with all harms that are not in and of themselves significant. Quite simply, such an approach would fundamentally undermine all of the environmental laws to which the maxim applies; a tyranny not of small decisions but rather all but the largest ones. While it is true that a cumulative effects approach is likely to narrow the circumstances shielded by the maxim's scope, such an approach has the distinct advantage of providing consistency and certainty to the task of identifying conduct subject to a given regulatory regime.
No doubt industry, and even some regulators, will argue that a cumulative effects approach to the de minimis analysis sets the bar too high and is overly burdensome. However, such an approach is clearly more in line with the foundational jurisprudence (The Reward) than one that fails to take cumulative effects into account. In addition, managing incremental harms to prevent cumulative effects need not be burdensome; it simply requires some creative regulatory thinking.
For example, where the enabling legislation so provides, regulators could and should adopt "minor work" regulations, the primary purpose of which would be to inform departmental officials of environmental impacts (perhaps also setting out some standard mitigation measures where these are known). by DFO were essentially such a regulation except that they were policy based and functioned as an exemption to the Act, 128 such that proponent notification was voluntary only. 129 Once gathered, significant advances in information technologies and geospatial mapping would allow this information to be dynamically mapped, giving industry and regulators a sense of which areas may require additional mitigation and where the department should focus its compliance efforts. 130 Similar maps have already been made available by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 131 and recent American scholarship suggests that such an approach to regulation is the future of the modern environmental state. 132 Finally, and most importantly, the continuing trend in Canada (as elsewhere) of environmental degradation makes plain that no department or agency in the environmental or natural resources context will succeed in its mandate if it fails to consider and manage the thousands of seemingly minor but cumulatively significant impacts to the environment. General permits are likely also superior to the two other options (specific permits and exemptions) in managing the environmental harms from the accumulation of thousands or millions of individual activities. Currently, many of these activities are exempt from government regulation. But as noted above, general permits-even if they impose minimal substantive and procedural burdens-can have significant advantages over an exemption. First, the general permit can allow the collection of information that can be used to design a more effective and politically sustainable regulatory program in the future. Second, it may be more feasible to, over time, increase regulatory standards if one begins with a general permit program rather than with an exemption. General permits also might make it more feasible for a regulatory agency to respond to emerging harms-for instance, an activity that previously was harmless because it was limited might become more widespread and begin causing significant damage. A general permit with minimal burdens might be relatively easily expanded into a general permit with some teeth that can more effectively combat the growing damage from the activity. In contrast, eliminating an exemption by imposing regulation where none existed at all may be much more difficult to accomplish, particularly when it requires legislative action. Finally, general permits might allow more public participation and accountability than a legislative exemption, given that there is at least a rulemaking process for the public to participate in and for courts to review.
